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Our working hypothesis is that cross-cultural differences in tax compliance behavior have 
foundations in the institutions of tax administration and citizen assessment of the quality of 
governance.  Tax compliance being a complex behavioral issue, its investigation requires use of a 
variety of methods and data sources.  Results from artefactual field experiments conducted in 
countries with substantially different political histories and records of governance quality 
demonstrate that observed differences in tax compliance levels persist over alternative levels of 
enforcement.   The experimental results are shown to be robust by replicating them for the same 
countries using survey response measures of tax compliance. 
 












One of the more vexing problems for policy makers in developing and transition economies is 
encouraging high levels of tax compliance.  This issue is independent of the overall tax “take” 
from GDP.  As Cowell (1990, p. 6) notes, “the issue of evasion is, unlike other illegal activities, 
inseparably bound up with the instruments of fiscal control that the government attempts to use in 
carrying out its economic policy.”  While reducing evasion improves the government’s revenue, it 
is a broader issue for the development of a civil order (Knack and Keefer 1997). 
However, reducing tax evasion is often not simply a matter of applying higher penalties and/or 
increasing the frequency of audits.  Extreme penalties may backfire by creating a setting in which 
bribery and corruption are more prevalent with the end result being lower tax compliance and a 
general loss of trust in public institutions.  Designing effective policies for reducing tax evasion 
requires understanding the behavioral aspects of the tax compliance decision.  Individual attitudes 
toward compliance have been shown to be a function of social and cultural norms (Elster 1989 and 
Naylor 1989).  If such attitudes would carry over to actual compliance, enhancing these norms, as 
through increasing overall trust in government, is a desirable policy instrument to complement the 
usual enforcement options.  Botswana and South Africa provide a good test of this hypothesis.  
These countries have experienced strikingly different social histories, despite being geographic 
neighbors and achieving independence at about the same time.  Thus, these countries offer a 
natural, or field, experiment for the investigation of the effects of tax morale stemming from 
perceptions of public institutions.  
We report on analyses of data derived from surveys and from an artefactual field experiment to 
investigate the effects of political norms on compliance behavior.1  Tax compliance is a complex 
                                                 
1 Tax compliance behavior has been studied using both field data and data obtained via laboratory experiments. 
Clotfelter (1983) and Feinstein (1991) used field data while Kinsey (1992), Smith (1992), and Forest and Sheffrin 










behavioral issue, and investigation requires the use of a variety of methods and data sources as 
each instrument has strength and weaknesses.  The use of survey and experimental data permits a 
broader exploration of the effects of such norms on tax compliance behavior and provides a 
robustness check.  Our approach is to conduct an artefactual field experiment (following the 
taxonomy presented by Harrison and List 2004) utilizing the comparative advantage of laboratory 
experiments (the potential to control for extraneous factors and to manipulate the variables of 
interest) in conjunction with the richer decision setting and participant pool that is available in the 
field.  It is this richer setting and a participant pool consisting largely of working adults that allows 
political norms into our analysis and a test of the effect of these on compliance behavior. 
The experimental and survey results reported in this paper provide support for the hypothesis 
that tax compliance increases with individual perceptions of good governance.2  The responses to 
the usual enforcement mechanisms (audits and penalties) are shown to be enhanced by these 
perceptions, which we can call tax morale, defined as the intrinsic motivation to pay taxes arising 
from the moral obligation to pay taxes as a contribution to society.  In the settings investigated via 
our artefactual field experiments, baseline compliance varies as expected given the political and 
social histories of the two countries, and while compliance does increase with enforcement effort, 
the effect is less in the country for which governance is less good.  The results reported provide 
support for a model of tax compliance behavior that extends beyond the typical “economics of 
crime” approach with its emphasis on enforcement effort and deterrence. 
                                                                                                                                                                
(2002) report the results of surveys of taxpayers.  Alm et al. (1992a, 1993) and Alm et al. (1999) have investigated 
compliance behavior in a variety of laboratory settings. Our study differs from some prior investigations of the effects 
of cultural norms on economic behavior (e.g., Roth et al. 1991) in that it places greater emphasis on differences in 
formal institutions as a cause of behavioral differences.  Thus, there is a somewhat extensive discussion of such 
factors in section III.  
2 Good governance includes a fair tax system, a government providing valued goods and services with the revenues, 
and a political system that is not corrupt. 










Analyses of data from surveys of public attitudes toward government show that perceptions of 
fairness and efficacy are considerably higher in Botswana and self-reported tax compliance is 
higher.  Tax compliance is difficult to observe in the field since it is an illegal, hence hidden, 
activity and direct observations are available only for the small fraction of taxpayers actually 
audited.  The results from our experiments, which allow us to implement identical enforcement 
policies in both countries, demonstrate differences in compliance behavior consistent with the 
social norms implied from the survey data.  Similarities in the tax systems permit use of the same 
jargon in each country and since English is widely used in both countries we are able to conduct 
the experiments in a common language.  These features facilitate our comparison of tax 
compliance behavior across these otherwise divergent cultures.  Our artefactual field experiments 
were conducted in the fall of 1999 and the survey data were collected during 1999 – 2000. 
Deficiencies in field data are well known and true field experiments are rare owing to the costs 
and complexities of manipulating the actual tax collection system.  A creative attempt in the use of 
a field experiment is Slemrod et al. (2001) who, working with the State of Minnesota, sent a letter 
(in January 1994) to a stratified random sample of roughly 2000 Minnesota taxpayers informing 
them that the tax returns they were about to file would be “closely examined”.  This experiment 
was designed to learn whether informing individuals about an increase in the probability of audit 
prior to filing a tax return would in fact increase their compliance.  In the absence of actual audits, 




                                                 
3 Alm and McKee (2006) report on a complementary lab experiment that confirms some results of Slemrod, 
Blumenthal, and Christian and address questions their data did not permit. 










II. The Analytics of the Tax Compliance Decision 
 The basic compliance model is based on Allingham and Sandmo (1972) and Yitzhaki 
(1974).  Suppose that an individual receives a fixed amount of income I and must choose how much 
to declare to the tax authorities.  Declared income D is taxed at the rate t.  Unreported income is not 
taxed; however, the individual may be audited with probability p, at which point a fine f is imposed 
on each dollar of unpaid taxes.4  For the interesting case where D < I, if underreporting is detected 
the individual's income IC equals IC = I - tD - ft(I-D), while, if underreporting is not detected income 
IN is IN = I - tD.  The individual chooses D to maximize the expected utility EU(I) of the evasion 
gamble, or EU(I) = pU(IC) + (1-p)U(IN), where utility U(I) is assumed to be a function only of 
income.  This optimization generates the first-order condition, pU'(IC)(f-1)t - (1-p)U'(IN)t = 0.  This 
is the basic portfolio model of tax compliance.  It is straightforward to show, within this model, that 
increases in the probability of an audit and/or the fine rate will increase compliance.  
Given the enforcement resources available to most governments, the observed high compliance 
rates are inconsistent with rational behavior.  Uncertainty regarding the actual audit practices may 
play a role.  Audit probabilities are largely subjective since the tax authority does not have an 
incentive to reveal the entire audit mechanism (Alm 1988) and individuals may have a tendency to 
overweight the probability of an audit.  Such behavior could support high levels of compliance even 
with low objective probability of an audit (Bernasconi 1998).  Nevertheless, extreme degrees of risk 
aversion would be required to explain observed levels of compliance.  Other factors must be at work.   
Tax compliance is enhanced when individuals view the paying of taxes as a fair fiscal exchange.  
In such situations compliance is likely to increase, ceteris paribus.  In particular, when the services 
provided by the government are viewed as widely desired and the decisions determining the services 
provided are transparent and fair, compliance is likely to be higher.  This latter factor is not captured 










in the conventional portfolio model of tax compliance.  Nevertheless, it is clear that these interactive 
effects may affect tax compliance decisions.   
The manner by which the public expenditure budget is determined is likely to have an effect 
on the level of compliance.  Alm et al. (1993) find that compliance is higher when the public good 
is voted on rather than imposed and when the political outcome is known to be widely supported.  
The means by which enforcement rules are determined can also influence compliance (Alm et al. 
1999).  Social norms and morals have been cited as reasons for high compliance with rules (Elster) 
and collective actions (Naylor).  Even simple personal ethics may affect tax compliance behavior 
independently of the fiscal exchange between the government and the taxpayers (Steenbergen et 
al. 1992).  Taken together these factors would lead us to modify the condition for optimal 
reporting portfolio to pU'(IC)(f-1)t - (1-p)U'(IN -γ)t = 0, where γ denotes the psychic cost associated 
with evading one’s own tax liability if one is not caught.5  The greater the moral support for 
government, the higher is the size of γ and the lower the utility from cheating.  The psychic costs 
associated with cheating arise only if one is actually cheating.  A taxpayer who complies fully and is 
not audited (I = D) experiences no change in utility.6  The genesis of social norms is the interesting 
issue (Alm and Martinez-Vasquez 2003).  If these norms evolve from perceptions that the quality 
of governance is high, we predict we will observe differences in tax compliance that are correlated 
with these perceptions.  With these factors in mind, we review the basic features of the personal 
income tax system and the perceptions of governance in South Africa and Botswana.  
III. The Tax Systems and Perceptions of Governance 
                                                                                                                                                                
4 For simplification, it is assumed that the tax authority uncovers all unreported income. 
5 Here we have assumed that if one is caught then the psychic costs of evasion are “washed out” as one pays the fine 
similar to the argument made by Gneezy and Rustichini (2000). 
6 An additional modification to the model is to make the audit probability a function of the level of evasion as we do 
in our experimental design.  Adding this to the model is straightforward (see Andreoni et al. 1998) and is omitted here 
to conserve space. 










A comparison of tax morale and compliance between Botswana and South Africa constitutes a 
good experiment since the tax systems themselves are similar but the political histories of the two 
countries could scarcely be more dissimilar. 
This section begins by describing features of the personal income tax (PIT) systems.  The 
elements of the tax structure are summarized in Table 1.  For the PIT, the self-assessment and 
audit processes are similar in both countries although there are varying degrees of aggressiveness 
in enforcement.  Both countries rely on some form of tax withholding at source and individual 
self-assessment and reporting of final tax liabilities.  Tax evasion is treated as a serious crime in 
South Africa; the tax authority exploits high profile cases to reinforce its reputation for tough 
enforcement.7  The Botswana the tax authority seems to be (relatively) more accommodating.  For 
example, a general tax amnesty was conducted in 1999.  This had not happened in South Africa 
when the present study was conducted. 
[TABLE 1 here] 
The Botswana investigative division carries out audits in cases where tax evasion is suspected.  
Civil penalties can also be imposed for failure to file if taxes are owed.  These penalties consist of 
interest (two percent per month) and a penalty up to the tax owed.  Criminal penalties up to one 
year can be imposed for egregious evasion and/or fraud.  The South Africa penalty structure is 
generally harsher; a person required to file a return who fails to do so within the period mentioned 
above is liable to a penalty up to R2000 and/or to imprisonment for a period up to twelve months.  
Further, taxable income may be estimated and three times the amount of tax charged thereon.  Any 
taxpayer who knowingly and willfully makes false statements in the return or evades or attempts 
to evade taxation (and any person who assists a taxpayer to do so) is liable to a penalty up to 
                                                 
7 About the time of our experiments, a South African newspaper article reported that Bishop Desmond Tutu’s son 
Trevor was sentenced to 12 months in jail for tax evasion (The Star, October 28, 1999, p 6, Johannesburg, SA). 










R1000 and/or to imprisonment for a period up to two years.  The taxpayer is, in addition, liable to 
be assessed and charged three times the amount of the evaded tax.  The level of sophistication of 
the tax enforcement apparatus differs considerably between Botswana and South Africa.8     
The respective computations of the PIT bases are similar.  In South Africa the PIT base 
consists of wages and salaries as well as passive income (e.g., interest and dividends) but not 
capital gains.  In Botswana, the PIT base includes wages and salaries as well as all investment 
income (interest, dividends, and capital gains).  The marginal rate is capped at 25 percent in 
Botswana, lower than the top rate in South Africa (45 percent).   
It is expected that tax compliance will be affected by enforcement effort but also by the 
inhibitors that are inherent in the individual perception of the quality of governance.  Both 
countries take steps to associate taxation with the provision of government services.9  Botswana’s 
political history is virtually unique among African countries.  Although a former colony (British) 
and only recently (1966) gained independence, diamond-rich Botswana is one of Africa's oldest 
multiparty democracies having successfully made the transition to self-governance.  Several 
elections have been held since independence, and all have been quiet affairs with none of the 
violence or corruption charges that have accompanied elections in neighboring countries.  In fact, 
the government of Botswana takes great pride in its stability and refers to itself as the “gem of 
Africa” in many official publications.  Acemoglu et al. (2002) report that pre-colonial tribal 
institutions developed by the Tswana tribes encouraged cooperation and participation and helped 
to constrain political elites.  The Botswana experience is in marked contrast with South Africa 
with its well-known history of apartheid and social discord.  Indeed elections in South Africa held 
                                                 
8 SARS implemented a modern computerized tax collections and administration monitoring system in 1997 that is 
hoped to improve data integrity, reduce human intervention, and increase effectiveness and productivity.  Botswana’s 
tax administration system is evolving but enjoys few resources.   










immediately prior to our period of analysis were controversial and accompanied by violence.  
Both the white and black populations have reason to be suspicious of the government.  The white 
population has been concerned about protection of property rights (especially in the face of 
proposals for land reform) while the black population has little reason to trust any government.  
The newly formed government (led initially by Nelson Mandela) had not, as of the time of our 
data collection, generated a record sufficiently long to establish trust.  Crime rates were very high, 
and there was a feeling that the social order was somewhat fragile.10 
[TABLE 2 – here] 
The perceived quality of governance institutions affects taxpayers’ willingness to comply with 
taxes (Smith 1992, Smith and Stalans 1991).  Table 2 provides detailed institutional comparisons.  
Transparency International’s Corruption Perception Index, which relates corruption perceptions of 
various countries’ government, indicates considerable differences between Botswana and South 
Africa: Botswana’s score is some 20 percent higher (better) than South Africa’s.  These results are 
consistent with the Quality of Governance Index provided by Kaufmann et al. (2003).  Botswana 
has higher control of corruption than South Africa.  Similarly, the rule of law index, which 
measures the degree of respondents’ confidence in and compliance with the rules of society, is 
more than three times larger in Botswana.  Consequently, the respect of citizens for the state and 
the institutions that govern economic and social interactions is higher in Botswana.  The capacity 
of the government to formulate and implement sound policies effectively (represented as the 
government effectiveness and regulatory quality) is higher in Botswana, which also has a higher 
                                                                                                                                                                
9 For example, the tax legislation of South Africa explicitly states, “taxes are not a punishment, they are the price paid 
for government services.” 
10 From an analysis of 1997 Interpol data, Schönteich (2000) reports that, of 110 countries listed, South Africa had the 
highest per capita rates of murder and rape, the second highest rate of robbery and violent theft, and the fourth highest 
rates of serious assault and sexual offences. Between 1997 and 1999, the number of reported crimes in South Africa 
increased by 12%, and the number of reported violent crimes increased by 13%. 










level of political stability and absence of violence.  Only voice and accountability are higher in 
South Africa, referring to the process by which governments are selected, monitored and replaced.  
Overall, the values of these six governance dimensions for the periods 1998 and 2000, based on 
several hundred variables measuring perceptions of governance and derived from 25 different data 
sources, clearly indicate a higher level of institutional quality in Botswana compared to South 
Africa.  These results are also supported by the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG), 
constructed by Stephen Knack (Knack, 1999) and the IRIS Center, University of Maryland and 
provided by the PRS Group, which offers an alternative set of data to the Quality of Governance 
Index, with special emphasis on aspects affecting private foreign investment decisions.   
Table 2 also shows that political rights and the level of civil liberty are similar in both 
countries. To measure the variable income inequality,  we use the newest available dataset, 
Estimated Household Income Inequality (EHII), constructed by Galbraith and Kum (2005).11  The 
GINI coefficients indicate that income inequality is slightly greater in Botswana.  The Index of 
Economic Freedom clearly indicates a higher fiscal burden12 for South Africa, but also less 
government interventions in South Africa.  The Polity IV dataset shows, in line with previous 
datasets, that Botswana has more stable political institutions than South Africa.  
We utilize data from the Afrobarometer, a relatively new survey measuring the social, political 
and economic atmosphere in more than ten countries in Africa.  This dataset allows us to incorporate 
the newest data covering Botswana (year 1999) and South Africa (year 2000).  The Afrobarometer 
has a focus on self-reported compliance with the following question to measure tax honesty: 
                                                 
11 Galbraith and Kum (2005) estimate gross household income inequality from a regression between the Deininger 
and Squire (1996) inequality measures and the UTIP-UNIDO pay inequality measures.  
12 The index of fiscal burden measures the burden a government imposes on its citizens. The following variables 
have been integrated in the index: top income tax rate, tax rate an average taxpayer faces, top corporate tax rate 










We would like to remind you that your responses to this interview are confidential. Here is 
a list of actions ordinary people are taking in a political system. For each of these, please 
tell me whether you have engaged in this activity or not?  
Avoid paying income taxes. 
We have coded the variable as follows: “Yes, often”, “Yes, a few times”, and “Yes, once or twice”: 
0, “No, but would do it if had the chance”: 1, “No, would never do this”: 2.  Answers of “don’t 
know” and missing values were not coded and were dropped from the sample.  We use the survey 
data to conduct a multivariate analysis of tax compliance in the two countries.  A dummy variable is 
used to control for unobserved differences across the two countries, and several variables are used to 
control for additional factors affecting tax morale.  Given the scaled ranking information of the 
dependent variables, we use an ordered probit estimation, and the estimating equation is nonlinear.  
Since this allows direct interpretation of only the sign of the estimated coefficients, we compute the 
marginal effects to estimate the change in the share of taxpayers (the probability of) belonging to a 
specific honesty rank when the independent variable increases by one unit.  We present (see Table 3) 
the marginal effects only for the highest honesty rank.  We observe that individuals in Botswana are 
more compliant than those in South Africa.  The marginal effects indicate that being a resident of 
Botswana rather than of South Africa increases the probability of reporting the highest tax honesty 
by around 6 percentage points, and this result is robust across various specifications.  These results 
support our basic hypothesis that compliance will be higher for countries with “better” governance. 
[TABLE 3 here] 
 
IV. Experimental Design and Hypotheses 
                                                                                                                                                                
and government expenditures measured as a percentage of GDP. The scores of the income tax rate and the corporate 
tax rate are measured separately and then averaged to get a single taxation score. The final score for the fiscal burden 










Tax evasion is, by definition, a hidden activity.  Even when there are field data from audit 
programs, these data typically do not cover sufficient policy changes to inform on the effects of 
individual policy parameters on compliance.  Naturally occurring field data tell us little about 
those not audited, the overwhelming majority of the population.  Given the non-random nature of 
most audit regimes, such selection issues make empirical analysis problematic even if we believe 
we can correct for the selection through econometric techniques.  Artefactual field experiments 
can be used to generate data to investigate responses to changes in enforcement and impose the 
same levels of policy action for participants in each country. 
Investigating the effects of cultural norms in the laboratory raises the question as to whether it 
is possible to convey these norms to the participants in the lab.  Since the objective of our research 
is to examine the effect of cultural factors and social norms on tax compliance behavior, to induce 
the participants to treat our controlled setting as if a tax compliance decision, the experimental 
setting incorporates tax language and terminology to encourage the participants to incorporate 
social norms and cultural factors in their tax reporting decision.13  In the experimental setting 
treatments involve changing basic parameters of the tax compliance enforcement system such as 
audit and penalty rates.  The differences across the countries can be investigated as shift effects.  
In sum, the tax context is emphasized in order that the governance effect be emphasized. 
a) Experiment Design and Participant Decision Setting 
The experiment setting replicates most of the elements of the basic structure of the personal 
income tax system in the study countries as described in Table 1.  In the experiment, individuals 
                                                                                                                                                                
consists of the averaged scores for income and corporate taxation and for government expenditures. 
13 Our experimental setting imposes the same tax policy parameters on all subject groups.  This is necessary in order 
to evaluate behavior across different cultures and countries. Alm et al. (1992b) conclude from experiments with 
student participants that there is no difference in behavior in experiments that use neutral terminology versus those 
that use tax specific language.  Wartick et al. (1999) find there are behavioral differences with adult participants as we 
use here. 










receive income, pay taxes on income voluntarily reported, and face a probability of audit.  If they 
are detected cheating, they pay a financial penalty on taxes not reported.  Of course, incarceration 
is not a possible penalty in the experimental setting.  The individual compliance decision for a 
given set of parameters and a given cultural baseline is expected to be a function of risk attitude.  
All participants participated in an initial experiment designed to elicit risk attitudes.  In this 
experiment the participants choose either a certain payoff or a gamble for ten probabilities, 
ranging from 0.1 to 1.0, of the high payoff from the gamble.14  Participants select either the safe or 
risky option for all ten choices, and this screen disappears until the tax experiment is completed.  
After the tax compliance experiment is completed the risk screen reappears with the participant’s 
previous choices indicated.  One participant rolls a 10-sided die to determine which of the choices 
will be used to compute a payoff.  For those choosing the risky option the participant rolls a 
second die to determine the realized payoff.  The degree of risk aversion is measured by the 
probability of the high payoff from the risk gamble that the individual requires in order to switch 
from the safe gamble.  This is an early variant of the experimental design used by Holt and Laury 
(2002).  A maintained hypothesis is that risk attitudes are the same across the cultures being 
investigated.  This is confirmed by our results as discussed later. 
Since the participant pools are exposed to identical experimental parameters, observed 
differences in tax compliance behavior are interpreted as deriving from differences in those 
institutional features affecting attitudes to government (governance quality) affecting the 
inhibitors.15 
                                                 
14 The payoff space in the risk experiment is approximately the same as one period of the tax experiment. 
15  There is no explicit public good included in our experimental setting.  Our objective is to observe behavior in a tax-
like setting where the individuals bring their perceptions of government to the decision setting.  This is encouraged via 
the use of tax language.  Inclusion of a “public good” in this setting would confound the decision environment being 
investigated by converting our broader social setting into a local public good provision setting. 










These experiments are fully computerized.16  The screen image the participants interact with is 
a simplified tax form, and the language on the screen and in the instructions describes the setting 
as tax reporting decision.17  Participants are told they have received income and are required to 
disclose this income to be taxed (at a stated rate) by a tax agency.  Participants are told that only 
they know their income and that they may disclose any amount up to the amount of income they 
have received.  They are also told that they may be audited and any income not disclosed will be 
detected and a fine imposed.  All of the relevant parameters are described in the instructions and 
are provided on the screen at all times the participants are making their decisions.18 
The experimental software is highly interactive.  The computer screen informs the participants 
of the base audit probability and penalty.  When the participant enters a proposed income 
disclosure, the screen updates the conditional audit probability.  The probability is determined by 
the formula: Actual Probability = Base Probability + 0.001 (Actual Income – Disclosed Income).19 
The participants are free to experiment with different disclosure decisions until they actually click 
on the “File Taxes” button.  The screen updates and informs the participants of the actual 
(endogenous) probability of being audited whenever the participant enters an income level to 
disclose.  The screen also informs the participants of the outcome (take home income) that would 
                                                 
16 The experiments were conducted using the portable experimental laboratory of Georgia State University.  This 
facility consists of up to 20 networked notebook computers transported to the site for the purpose of conducting the 
laboratory experiments.  Participant computers are situated in folding partitions to ensure private decisions.  The 
instructions for the experiments are conveyed via a portable projector demonstrating the screen interface and through 
a set of verbal instructions read by the same experimenter in all sessions.   
17 The screen image may be requested by contacting the corresponding author. 
18 The design and its implementation were constructed to minimize the problems faced by Roth et al. when conducting 
experiments in different environments.  In our experiments, the language in all settings is English, the experimenter 
was the same person in all cases, and the currency conversions were handled such that the subjects were paid the same 
multiple of the average market earnings in each labor market.  Since the portable lab was used for all experiments, the 
participants saw exactly the same interface in all cases. 
19 Thus, the audit probability begins at a base level and increases (linearly) with the level of unreported income.  This 
was introduced to increase realism.  In tax systems that utilize taxpayer provided information, it is generally the case 
that the likelihood of an audit increases the greater the non-compliance.  While our setting may have provided the 
participants with more precise information than would arise in the naturally occurring setting, we wanted to be sure 
we were capturing responses to explicit policy parameters rather than differences in perceptions of these parameters. 










be added to their balance if they were audited and if they were not audited.  While the participants 
may input different values and observe the prospective results, there is a time limit imposed;  
participants must click on the “File Taxes” button within two minutes and are warned when the 
time limit is approaching.  This simulates the necessity of filing within the legal time limit.  
Once all participants have disclosed their income, the audit process begins.  While the base 
audit probability is the same for all participants, the effective audit probabilities differed according 
to the level of income reported.  The computer screen informs the participants of their effective 
audit probability based on their intended declaration prior to their actually submitting their tax 
report.  After the audit process, the computer screen informs each participant of her individual 
outcome.  If she is audited, she is told the level of the fine imposed and the resulting net income 
for the period.  If she is not audited, she is so informed.  The total number of participants audited 
is announced at the end of each round. 
[TABLE 4 here] 
Several treatments are conducted (Table 4).  The experiments employ a within subject design.  
Thus, each participant sees several treatments during a session and the order of the treatments is 
changed for each session.20  To ensure that the data sets would encompass a sufficient number of 
treatments and be comparable, it was decided that the design would involve having each 
participant participate in three different settings (series A) lasting a total of nine decision rounds 
(three consecutive rounds in each setting).  Since there are four settings in Series A, the 
participants were randomly assigned across these.  A second series (series B) of experiments was 
                                                                                                                                                                
 
20 We adopted a within subject design for several reasons.  It increases statistical power since the characteristics of the 
participants are held constant while the decision treatment is altered.  Second, there was limited scheduled time at 
some of the sites where the experiments were conducted and the number of sessions that would be possible to conduct 
each site was unknown until the experimenters actually arrived on site.   










run in which the only treatment variable was the audit rate, which changed every two rounds, and 
all participants experienced all the treatments in this series. 
The parameters for each treatment setting are reported in Table 4.  The participants received 
the same income (405 lab dollars) in each round.  They were not informed of the number of 
rounds that a given treatment would be in effect, nor were they informed of the number of 
treatments they would face during the session.  The exchange rate from lab dollars to local 
currency was announced prior to the start of the experiment.  The audit rates reported in Table 6 
represent the base audit probability, but the actual audit probability is endogenous since it varies 
inversely with the amount disclosed, as discussed above.  The fine rates represent the multiplier 
imposed on unpaid taxes if the individual was audited.  The expected value of audit is simply the 
product of the audit probability and fine rate.  This single metric is useful for comparing across 
treatments although it has no behavioral implications.   
b) Participant Pools 
Participants (staff and students) from South Africa and Botswana were recruited by personnel 
at the respective (state) universities.21  In total, there were six sessions run in Botswana and South 
Africa with 99 participants in the former and 88 in the latter.  The average age in the Botswana 
sessions was 25.4 (standard deviation 6.11) and 28.4 (standard deviation 8.61) in South Africa.  In 
all, 33 percent of the South Africa participants were students and 27 percent in Botswana.  All 
participants had prior experience filing their own taxes.  The participant pools are not 
representative of the populations of the respective countries; the pool is younger and better 
educated than the general population.  However, the pools are similar in terms of education and 
                                                 
21 Sessions were conducted at University of Pretoria in South Africa, University of the North in South Africa, and 
University of Botswana.   The participants were told that the experiments would be conducted by personnel from other 
institutions and that their behavior would not be reported to anyone at their own institutions or to anyone else. 










incomes across the two countries, thus facilitating our investigation of the contribution of 
governance to tax compliance.   
For this experimental investigation, the objective was to create a controlled field setting with 
the properties of a tax-filing problem.  This reminds the participants of the naturally occurring 
setting they face when selecting their tax compliance strategy in the field.  Participant earnings 
were paid in the local currency (Rand and Pula).  The payment rate in all sessions is approximately 
three times the average adult wage in the region.  By all casual observations, the participants were 
highly motivated by the cash payoffs.22  Analysis of observed behavior across participant pools 
within country confirmed that these samples could be pooled.   
c) Hypotheses Investigated 
The usual “economics of crime” result for tax compliance behavior suggests that by 
making the evasion gamble less attractive, fewer people will choose to evade.  Thus our first 
hypothesis:  
H1: Compliance levels increase as the audit probability increases and as the penalty 
rate increases.  This holds for both countries. 
 
The experimental literature suggests that participants will bring to the laboratory their 
perceptions of the consequences and ethics of tax evasion when the experimental setting reinforces 
this through the use of tax language in the experimental instructions.  Since the experimental 
parameters (tax rate, laboratory income, and enforcement) are the same for both participant pools, 
the governance background of the two participant pools constitutes an orthogonal treatment.  The 
central hypothesis is that observed differences in behavior across the pools is due to social or 
cultural factors.  These factors are predicted to lead to systematically different reactions to the 
                                                 
22 Based on expected compliance rates we set the exchange rates for the lab currency to yield approximately 40 
Rand/hour and 10 Pula/hour.  At the time the exchange rate for the Rand was approximately 4 per US dollar and for 










same experimental parameters.  The experiments reported here are intentionally very context 
intensive.  The main hypothesis focuses on differences due to cultural effects.  The discussion in 
Section III concerning perceptions of the public sector, the quality of the political institutions, and 
the level of tax compliance obtained with survey data lead to the following prediction: 
H2: The compliance rate will be higher in Botswana than in South Africa, ceteris paribus. 
 
V. Experimental Results 
Summary statistics are presented in Table 5.  The participants appeared to understand the 
setting as compliance generally increased with enforcement effort.  The data show that there are 
some clear differences in behavior across countries.  This is borne out by the results reported in 
Tables 6 and 7, which report the econometric estimations of the Series B and Series A data 
respectively.  The participants’ response to changes in the audit probability indicate that we cannot 
reject our Hypothesis 1.  We can focus on the effects of participant characteristics, country 
(Botswana is omitted), and individual audit experience.  The dependent variable, Compliance 
Rate, is censored, so we use a random effects panel Tobit estimation.  The results in Table 6 show 
that individual audit experience affects compliance and that participants in South Africa exhibit 
lower compliance (statistically significant at the 0.05 level).  Thus, we cannot reject our 
Hypothesis 2, that low quality governance exerts a negative effect on compliance.  
[TABLES 5, 6 and 7 here] 
In the Series A experiments the audit probability and the penalty rate were varied.  The 
intention was that all participants would experience all four treatments.  However, the participants 
were to be randomly assigned an order, and time limits prevented us from completing all possible 
treatments with all groups.  There are substantially fewer observations for series A4.  Further, the 
                                                                                                                                                                
the Pula was approximately 5 per US dollar.  The modal earnings were close to our expected values with a range of 
approximately 30 – 60 Rand per hour and 6 – 18 Pula. 










software reassigned participants to different terminal identifiers for each series, and no consistent 
means is available to track the participants through all of the treatments they experienced.  Since 
the data constitute a panel within a treatment and we must account for possible serial dependence, 
we have elected to run treatment-specific models as reported in Table 7.  The cost is that we 
cannot independently obtain coefficients for the enforcement treatment variables.  The estimation 
employed is a random effects panel Tobit.  The Age variable has the expected sign while the 
Occupation dummy variable is not significant in any specification.  In three of the four series the 
coefficient on the country dummy indicates that the compliance rate is statistically lower in South 
Africa.  This is further confirmation, with a different set of treatment parameters, that our 
hypothesis of lower compliance in South Africa is not rejected by the experimental data. 
The observed behavioral differences across the pools might be argued to be due to differences 
in risk attitudes (e.g., cultural differences toward taking gambles) rather than the institutional 
features of the fiscal sectors in the countries.  The data from the risk attitude experiments allows us 
to investigate this conjecture as noted above.  The risk taking behavior of the pools is not 
statistically different based on a Chi-squar  test (at a 0.01 confidence level) and confirmed via a 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov test.  Observed differences in behavior would not appear to be due to pool 
specific differences in risk attitudes.  While we cannot eliminate all individual factors, the result 
for risk attitudes strengthens our conjecture that differences are due to cultural factors attributable 
to differences in governance quality. 
 
VI. Concluding Comments  
Tax compliance (evasion) is a complex decision that is motivated by a variety of factors.  The 
threat of detection and punishment is clearly a factor, and evidence from a variety of sources 










supports the proposition that increased enforcement leads to increased compliance.  However, 
observed compliance levels are typically higher than warranted by the level of enforcement.  This 
has led to the formation of theories based on exceptional risk aversion (such as prospect theory 
and rank dependent expected utility).  A promising line of inquiry has been the effect of social 
norms on compliance behavior.  There is evidence that these norms are influenced by the tax 
regime and by the responsiveness of government to the wishes of the citizens.  Thus, some cultural 
differences in compliance behavior are expected, and these differences should be related to tax 
regimes and government behavior.  The results reported in this paper generally support these 
arguments.  We predicted that compliance would be higher in Botswana, and this is confirmed by 
the results from the survey data and the experimental investigations.  An alternative explanation of 
differences in risk attitudes or a reluctance to engage in gambles is rejected by the data.  The two 
pools exhibit the same attitudes toward risk in a simple context free gamble experiment.  This is a 
useful result; policy makers are able to influence the perception of the public sector much more 
readily than they can alter the underlying risk behavior of constituents.   
The usual caveat regarding the use of laboratory experiments to inform our understanding of 
behavior in the naturally occurring world is more in force than usual for an investigation such as 
ours.  The cautions of List and Levitt (2007) must be borne in mind here.  Does our laboratory 
setting provide for the necessary degree of “parallelism” to the naturally occurring world that is 
crucial to generalizing our experimental results beyond the setting of the lab (Plott 1987)?  The 
experimental setting need not attempt to capture all of the variation in the naturally occurring 
environment, but it must sufficiently recreate the fundamental elements of the naturally occurring 
world if the results are to be relevant in policy debates.  While our payoffs are relatively small, our 
experimental setting provides the computations necessary for the decision and a clear link between 










decisions and rewards, thus reducing the decision costs.  More to the point, were our laboratory 
results not so consistent with the more qualitative results obtained via the surveys, we would be 
much less willing to argue that we can generalize beyond the lab.  As an example of the usefulness 
of an artefactual field experiment, our paper demonstrates the capability of this investigative tool 
to address not only important basic behavioral questions but also complex policy questions in 
ways that are not accessible to other types of economic investigations. 
Although one study cannot, in itself, assert a methodological consideration, the consistency of 
the results we report from our artefactual field experiment and the survey based results provide 
support for incorporating the language of the field setting into the laboratory setting as a 
prerequisite to generalizing the results beyond the lab.  Providing context is important if our 
objective is to have the participants bring to the lab setting the lessons learned in their life 
experiences.  In this sense, a significant contribution of this paper to the literature on cross cultural 
effects on tax compliance is the joint use of survey data on tax morale and an artefactual field 
experiment framed in tax language that investigates compliance behavior.  Our experimental and 
survey results provide mutual support for the hypothesis that tax morale enhance compliance, for 
given enforcement effort, and our results demonstrate that the quality of governance has an 
observable impact on tax compliance precisely because we have implemented our stylized tax 
setting in the lab rather than using a context-free experimental environment.  Our findings further 
suggest the relevance of models of tax compliance that go beyond the conventional “economics of 
crime” approach and that capture the role of institutions, in particular how individuals perceive 
their governments, in explaining why individuals pay taxes.  Our results suggest that traditional 
remedies to induce higher tax compliance will perform much better if accompanied with 
improvements in governance. 










Table 1 – Features of the Tax System in the Study Countries (effective in year 2000) 




Withholding  Yes Yes 
Highest Marginal Rate 45% 25%
Audit Enforcement 
     Financial Penalty 
      
 
     Incarceration? 
 
Yes (Max: Double Tax 
Owed plus Interest) 
 
Yes (Up to Two Years) 
 
Yes (Max: Tax Owed 
plus Interest) 
 
Yes (Up to One Year) 
Mandatory Filing No (Unless Tax Owed) No (Unless Tax Owed) 
Central Government 
Tax Amnesty 
Not Prior to 2000 Yes (in 1999) 
 










TABLE 2 – Governance and Country Indicators 
  Botswana South Africa Year 
CPI a 6.1 (Ranking 24) 5 (Ranking 34) 1999 
GOVERNANCE INDICATORS b    
Control of Corruption 0.53 0.42 1998 
 1.02 0.57 2000 
Rule of Law 0.66 0.21 1998 
 0.67 0.28 2000 
Regulatory Quality 0.69 0.33 1998 
 0.79 0.12 2000 
Government Effectiveness 0.52 0.17 1998 
 0.98 0.43 2000 
Political Stability 0.89 -0.80 1998 
 0.90 -0.13 2000 
Voice and Accountability 0.77 0.87 1998 
 0.78 1.05 2000 
ICRGc    
Composite Risk Rating 81.00 66.75 January, 1999 
Political Risk Rating 76.00 69.00 January, 1999 
Economic Risk Rating 42 31.5 January, 1999 
Law and Order  4 3 January, 1999 
Bureaucratic Quality 2 2 January, 1999 
Ethnic Tensions 5 3 January, 1999 
Democratic Accountability 3 4 January, 1999 
Corruption in Government 3 3 January, 1999 
External Conflict 10 9 January, 1999 
Government Stability 11 11 January, 1999 
Internal Conflict 12 9 January, 1999 
EHII INEQUALITYd 48.37 44.68 1998 
Index of Economic Freedome    
Fiscal Burden 2.6 4.3 1999 
Government Intervention 4.5 2.5 1999 
Property Rights 2 3 1999 
Regulation 3 2 1999 
Informal Market 4 4 1999 
POLITY IVf    
Institutionalized Democracy 9 9 1999 
Regime Durability 33 5 1999 
ETHNIC FRACTIONALIZATIONg 0.410 0.752 1997-2001 
Notes: a Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index (10= highly clean, 1= highly corrupt). b Source 
Kaufmann et al.. Values between –2.5 and 2.5, with higher scores corresponding to better institutions (outcomes). c 
The higher the rating, the lower the risk and vice versa, see Knack (1999). d Higher GINI coefficient implies more 
inequality (source: Galbraith and Kum). e The scores range from 1 to 5 (1=environment/set of policies are most 
conducive to economic freedom, 5= least conducive), see 2005 Index of Economic Freedom handbook, chapter 5 (see 
http://www.heritage.org/research/features/index/). f The Democracy indicator is an additive eleven-point scale (0-10). 
Regime Durability: number of years since the most recent regime change or the end of transition period defined by the 
lack of stable political institutions (see http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/inscr/polity/).  
 g Higher ethnic score implies a stronger ethnic fractionalization (source: Alesina et al. 2003). 










Table 3- Determinants of Tax Compliance in Botswana (1999) and South Africa (2000) 
Ordered Probit EQ1   EQ2   EQ3   
Independent Variables Coeff. t-ratio Marg. Coeff. t-ratio Marg. Coeff. t-ratio Marg. 
a) Socio-Demogr. Factors          
FEMALE 0.092* 1.79 0.023 0.084 1.523 0.022 0.029 0.478 0.007 
AGE 0.010*** 3.265 0.003 0.012*** 4.593 0.003 0.012*** 4.348 0.003 
EDUCATION 0.004 -0.746 0.001 0.009 0.484 0.002 0.016 0.832 0.004 
b) Employment Status          
OCCUPATION   -0.140** -2.039 -0.036 0.136 0.999 0.034 
EMPLOYER       0.73 1.405 0.184 
MINER       -0.022 -0.163 -0.005 
FARMER       0.351*** 3.452 0.089 
DOMESTIC   -0.052 -0.269 -0.013 
ARMED 
SERVICES/POLICE/SEC       0.363*** 3.235 0.092 
STUDENT       0.384 0.932 0.097 
DISABLED       0.105 1.296 0.027 
c) Culture          
BOTSWANA 0.238*** 5.711 0.06 0.215*** 3.256 0.055 0.236*** 3.540 0.06 
Observations 3059   2752   2752   
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000   0.000   0.000   
 
Notes: Dependent variable: tax compliance on a three-point scale. In the reference group are MAN, WITHOUT AN 
OCCUPATION, WORKER, SOUTH AFRICA. Significance levels: * 0.05 < p < 0.10, ** 0.01< p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.  
Marginal effect = highest tax morale score (2).  
 
Table 4 – Experimental Design (Parameters) 
 
Treatments 

















A1 0.10 1.5 0.15 B1 0.10 3.0 0.3 
A2 0.30 3.0 0.90 B2 0.20 3.0 0.6 
A3 0.10 3.0 0.30 B3 0.30 3.0 0.9 
A4 0.30 1.5 0.45 B4 0.40 3.0 1.2 
 
Table 5 – Summary Statistics – Average Compliance Rates (number of participants) 
 
Treatments 
Series A  
South Africa Botswana Treatments 
Series B 
South Africa Botswana 
A1 0.494 (88) 0.617 (99) B1 0.513 (88) 0.565 (99) 
A2 0.618 (88) 0.721 (94) B2 0.597 (88) 0.660 (99) 
A3 0.485 (42) 0.622 (80) B3 0.637 (88) 0.747 (99) 
A4 0.569 (46) 0.418 (20) B4 0.697 (88) 0.750 (99) 
 










Table 6 – Panel Tobit Estimation (Random Effects) with Series B Data 
                (Dependent Variable = Compliance Rate) 
Independent 
Variable 
Predict Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 








































Number of Obs  1328 1162 1162 
Left-Censored  94 71 71 
Right-Censored  246 228 228 
Chi-Sq  11.50*** 18.22*** 21.36*** 
Log Likelihood  -701.65 -610.35 -604.79 
 
Table 7 – Panel Tobit Estimation with Series A Experiment Data – Treatment Specific Models 
                (Dependent Variable = Compliance Rate) 
  Experiment Series 
Independent 
Variable 
Predict Series A1 Series A2 Series A3 Series A4 
































Number Observations  558 546 366 180 
Left Censored  54 32 52 41 
Right Censored  94 98 56 13 
Wald Ch-sq  7.58** 10.49** 8.32** 9.05** 
Log likelihood  -375.65 -300.80 -239.08 -118.73 
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